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HABEAS CORPUS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
MICHAEL WELLS*
Discussion concerning the proper scope of federal habeas corpus
for state prisoners usually focuses upon the use of the writ as a federal
remedy for procedural errors of constitutional magnitude in state crim-
inal trials. Proponents of "liberal" habeas argue that only federal
courts can adequately protect the federal procedural rights of state
criminal defendants,' while critics contend that the states' interest in
administering their criminal laws free from federal interference over-
shadows the asserted benefits.2 Setting the proper scope of the writ re-
quires a weighing of these competing values.
The focus on procedure is appropriate, because the vast majority
of habeas petitions are brought by prisoners convicted of ordinary
crimes contending that procedural rules3 were violated in the process
that resulted in their confinements. Sometimes, however, the crime it-
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of Virginia. The author wishes to thank John D. Eure, William D. Iverson and Graham B.
Strong for their helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER];
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights.- Federal Re-
moval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Amsterdam];
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 441 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator];
Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalisnr Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Cover & Aleinikoff];
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L.
REv. 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly];
Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REV. 321 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro];
Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Developments];
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as First Amendment-Overbreadth].
1. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1037-44; Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Pris-
oners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 897-99 (1966).
2. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring);
Bator 444-53, 503-07.
3. The procedural rules at issue in these cases are rules mandated by the fourth, fifth and
sixth amendments, made applicable to state trials by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and procedural due process rules grounded in the fourteenth amendment. In this
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self is open to constitutional attack. A statute barring the distribution
of contraceptives to single, but not to married, persons may be attacked
on an equal protection theory.4 Or a statute punishing a person who
maintains a building which is "resorted to by narcotic drug addicts for
the purpose of using narcotic drugs and/or which is used for the illegal
keeping or selling of the same" may be challenged on the ground that it
is too vague to give an individual fair warning of what is proscribed.5
This Article will examine another class of substantive attacks on
habeas-those asserting that the petitioner's confinement violates his
first amendment rights of free speech, press or assembly. The thesis is
that when these rights are at issue, the considerations supporting broad
habeas are stronger, and the costs of habeas are lower, than when the
petitioner is asserting the violation of a federal procedural right. As a
result, the necessary choice of values is more easily resolved in favor of
broad first amendment habeas than it is for broad procedural habeas.
Essential to this analysis is the premise that a habeas court may
legitimately distinguish among constitutional rights. This premise rests
on the functional differences between habeas proceedings and appellate
review, where such distinctions among rights are not permissible. The
reasoning underlying the premise is developed in Part I. Part II de-
scribes the justifications for according distinctive and liberal treatment
to free speech claims. Part III considers some of the possible conse-
quences of drawing the suggested distinction between first amendment
and procedural habeas. It is suggested that different rules might govern
the cognizability of issues in habeas, as well as governing other aspects
of habeas relief, such as custody, exhaustion of state remedies, prospec-
tive or retroactive application of new decisions, and procedural default.
The proper approach to overbreadth review in habeas is also consid-
ered.7
Article the term "procedural habeas" is used as a shorthand method of referring to these attacks
upon state convictions.
4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (writ granted).
5. English v. Virginia Probation & Parole Bd., 481 F.2d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 1973) (writ de-
nied).
6. No position is advanced here as to the proper limits upon habeas for procedural claims,
nor is it argued that first amendment issues must be accorded better treatment as a matter of
constitutional law. Rather, the effort is to show that a principled distinction can be drawn be-
tween free speech and procedural rights by the Congress or the Supreme Court in determining the
appropriate scope of habeas.
7. Throughout this Article the interest in greater protection of constitutional rights through
habeas is weighed against the state's interest in values of finality and federalism. It might be
objected that rights, first amendment or otherwise, are not interests to be weighed against other
values but must be observed in spite of costs to the state's interests. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 522 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (complaining that Stone, by limiting habeas for fourth
amendment claims, "marks the triumph of those who have sought to establish a hierarchy of
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I. THE FUNCTION OF THE WRIT
The Supreme Court greatly expanded the availability of habeas
corpus in the 1950s and 1960s. Brown v. Allen' held that any constitu-
tional question could be raised on habeas. Fay v. Noia9 allowed a pris-
oner who had not properly preserved his constitutional claim in the
state courts nevertheless to assert the issue in a petition for habeas
corpus, so long as he had not "deliberately bypassed" state processes.
Jones v. Cunningham'° held that physical confinement was not neces-
sary in order to meet the requirement that the petitioner be "in cus-
tody." After Brown, Fay and Jones, habeas corpus was available to
attack virtually any constitutional defect in a state criminal trial. It
became quite easy to regard the writ as a kind of appellate review of
state criminal judgments, providing a federal forum to guarantee en-
forcement of the many new federal procedural rights that were made
applicable to the states in those decades."
No doubt this account accurately reflects the Warren Court's con-
constitutional rights, and to deny for all practical purposes a federal forum for review of those
rights that this Court deems less worthy or important"); cf. Cover & Aleinikoff 1092 (suggesting
that a cost-benefit analysis and a focus on the functions served by rights, as means of determining
whether claims will be heard in habeas, are "inconsistent with the very idea of rights").
This approach fails to appreciate the nature of the balancing that is at issue. The question in
setting the scope of habeas is not whether someone holds a right against the state or whether some
state interest might outweigh a person's rights. The question is what rules will be devised for the
protection of rights. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961) (distinguishing be-
tween primary rules, "which are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do,"
and secondary rules, which "specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively deter-
mined," id 92). The existence of a right implies a means for enforcing it, but the conclusion does
not follow that other interests may not be taken into account in devising those remedial proce-
dures. For example, a newspaper may assert its first amendment rights in defense of a libel suit.
But, if the paper loses, the rules of collateral estoppel bar it from relitigating the issue, however
wrong the result may have been. The cost to other values would be too great. When a criminal
defendant unsuccessfully asserts his rights at trial and on appeal and is imprisoned, his interest in
freedom from unconstitutional confinement may, but does not always, outweigh the competing
values and permit relief in habeas. To recognize that other values may diminish the avenues
available for protection of constitutional rights is not to insist that rights themselves must be bal-
anced against the state's interests. It is, rather, to appreciate the imperfection of legal procedures
as a means of protecting rights and the need to husband the limited economic, political and moral
resources available to the legal system. See Bator 451.
8. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
9. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
10. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
11. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511-12 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Geagin v.
Gavin, 181 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Mass. 1960), al'd, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 903 (1962). See also Cover & Aleinikoff 1037-44; Wright & Sofaer, supra note 1, at 897-99.
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ception of the proper role for habeas corpus. 2 Clearly, however, this
conception is at odds with the historic understanding of the writ as an
extraordinary remedy for extraordinary restraints on liberty.' 3  In its
early days, a petition for habeas corpus was permitted only to challenge
executive detentions or the jurisdiction of the committing court. 14
Later the concept of jurisdiction was expanded to allow attacks on the
constitutionality of the statutes underlying convictions, illegal sentences
and a few other matters.'" Later still a prisoner was permitted to raise
constitutional claims that had not been fully and fairly considered in
the state courts,' 6 or that rested on matters outside the state court rec-
ord, and thus could not be considered on appeal. 7 That was where the
law stood at the time of Brown.'8
For most of its history, then, habeas corpus was not a quasi-appel-
late review of state criminal convictions but rather served the more elu-
sive function of remedying restraints on liberty thought to be
"extraordinary,"' 9  "intolerable,''2 ° contrary to "basic justice,"21 or
which carried "a connotation of outrage"22 or were "affronts to the con-
science of a civilized society."23 As the steady expansion of the availa-
bility of habeas reveals, the Court's judgments about the kinds of
claims meeting this slippery test changed over the years. By the time
Fay was decided, the Court could assert that the intolerable restraints
that habeas was intended to remedy included any constitutional
claim.24 Not everyone agreed with that conclusion,25 but the significant
12. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 512 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("district courts
sitting in habeas [have been cast] in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts").
13. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 252-59 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448-76 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 532-48
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
14. See Expare Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); Bator 466.
15. See Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Expare Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873);
Bator 467-74.
16. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Bator 483-93.
17. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Bator 493-99.
18. These matters are addressed at length elsewhere. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
79 (1977) (dictum); Bator 463-99; Developments 1042-56. For a concise history of the writ from its
beginnings in twelfth-century England, see D. MEADOR, HABEAs COR.PUS AND MAGNA CARTA
(1966).
19. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 327 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
21. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.31 (1976).
22. Friendly 157.
23. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
24. Id at 426; see Note, Federal Habeas Corpausfor State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 78, 78-81 (1964).
25. See, e.g. Kauffman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231-42 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting);
Friendly; Bator.
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point here is that the Fay Court viewed habeas corpus not as a kind of
appellate review but in its historical context as a remedy for "persons
whom society has grievously wronged and for whom belated liberation
is little enough compensation."26 Thus the Court did not repudiate but
rather relied upon the historical conception of habeas.27
Other features of habeas are also difficult to reconcile with the
conception of the habeas process as a quasi-appellate review. The cus-
tody requirement, though much relaxed in recent years, still bars a pris-
oner from securing relief when there are insufficient legal restraints
upon him.28 Underlying the custody requirement is the "personal na-
ture" of the writ, "historically dedicated to the vindication of personal
rights."29 Unlike appeal, habeas corpus is a separate proceeding, and,
therefore, the court is not bound by the record; it may hold a hearing
and determine the facts for itself.30 The Fay decision also rests on these
distinctive features of habeas corpus. Because habeas is a separate pro-
ceeding and the habeas court acts on the body of the prisoner instead of
the judgment of the state court, a state procedural rule that would bar
the assertion of a constitutional issue on appeal will not do so on
habeas.31 "[Hiabeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very
26. 372 U.S. at 441. Much of the opinion is given over to an elaborate treatment of the
history of the writ, designed to show that the broad scope afforded habeas in Brown was consistent
with its past. See id at 399-426. See also HART & WECHSLER 1465. The Court's performance as
historian has drawn much criticism. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 253
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867" The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L.
REv. 31 (1965); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451
(1966).
27. The reasoning of the Fay opinion must be carefully distinguished from the impact of its
holding, as well as from the holdings in Brown and Jones. The Court's reasoning in Fay is consis-
tent with the historical conception of the writ, but the effect of the holdings in these cases was to
make habeas widely available, which in turn lent support to those, including members of the
Court, who would characterize habeas as a kind of appellate review of state judgments. See text
accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
28. See Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1978); Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); f Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977) (writ
denied; dismissed for mootness because the sentence had ended and there were no collateral con-
sequences).
29. Schwartz v. Lennox, 320 F. Supp. 754,756 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (writ unavailable to an estate
for purposes of economic gain); see Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 12 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(because of its personal nature, writ unavailable to labor organization held in contempt of court).
The personal nature of the writ is also illustrated by its availability as a remedy for executive
detentions that are wholly unconnected with judgments of civilian courts. See, e.g., Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (writ denied) (military); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (writ
granted) (immigration). See generally Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380
(1976).
30. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
31. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-31 (1963). Of course, by freeing a prisoner held
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tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside not in subordina-
tion to the proceedings ... .
The functional differences between habeas and direct review might
be articulated in another manner. On appellate review, attention is fo-
cused on the proceedings below.33 The appeals court is bound by the
record and must reverse for any error that is not harmless.3 4 In addi-
tion to correcting error, appellate review by the Supreme Court serves
the purpose of enunciating uniform rules of national law. 35 Habeas
performs no such law-pronouncing function.36 Although the legality of
the proceedings below might be at issue, the habeas court's focus is
upon the prisoner; the question is whether the restraint upon him is so
"extraordinary" or "intolerable" or so offends "basic justice" as to war-
rant his release.
If this standard is satisfied every time there is a constitutional vio-
lation in the petitioner's trial, then habeas corpus is most accurately
described as a kind of appellate review. As a matter of theory, habeas
and appeal would remain distinct, but the theoretical distinction would
be a quibble. In recent years, however, the Court has paid more atten-
tion to the historic function of habeas corpus and has attached less im-
portance to expansive federal review of state judgments. In Stone v.
Powell37 the Court held that fourth amendment claims may not be
raised on a petition for habeas corpus if there was an opportunity for
full and fair litigation of the claim in the state courts. The Court in
Wainwright v. Sykes 38 limited Fay, ruling that a prisoner must show
"cause" for his failure to comply with a state procedural rule requiring
that he make a contemporaneous objection to the introduction at trial
of an improperly obtained confession and also that "prejudice" re-
sulted from the use of the confession.39
These decisions reflect another distinctive feature of habeas
pursuant to a state court judgment, the grant of a petition for federal habeas corpus necessarily
renders the state court judgment nugatory.
32. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
34. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (stating harmless error rule).
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) ("the national and State systems are to be
regarded as ONE WHOLE. The courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the
execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal
which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice and the rules of national
decisions") (emphasis in original). See also Bator 453-54.
36. See Friendly 164-65. But cf. Cover & Aleinikoff 1046-68 (discussing the shaping of new
constitutional doctrine through habeas by the interaction of lower federal courts and state courts).
37. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
38. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
39. Id; see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (cause and prejudice test applied to a
1312 [Vol. 78:1307
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corpus--the significant costs placed upon the states' interests in finality
and federalism in controlling their criminal processes free from federal
interference. Francis v. Henderson4" and Wainwright both emphasize
the interest in federalism by assuring the integrity and effectiveness of
state procedural rules.4' The Stone Court noted that while habeas does
undercut the values of finality and federalism, such harm is acceptable
when the claim relates to innocence, for then the historical function of
habeas to remedy "intolerable restraints" and to do "basic justice" is
served by hearing the petition; however, these costs should not be in-
curred when the prisoner makes a fourth amendment claim, where "a
convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue
that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration."42
Stone, then, appears to be a retreat from the rulings in Brown and
Fay that any constitutional defect in the proceedings leading to the
petitioner's confinement enables the confinement to meet the standard
of "intolerable restraint" or "affront to the conscience" that is requisite
to relief on a habeas petition. In their place Stone announced an "in-
nocence-related" standard as the contemporary articulation of the his-
torical role of the writ to remedy extraordinary wrongs.43 The Stone
opinion, in retreating from Brown and Fay on the standard for the
failure properly to assert a claim that the state's method for selecting grand jurors was constitu-
tionally flawed).
40. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
41. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 88-90; Francis, 425 U.S. at 539-42.
42. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31; see id at 490.
43. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1069-72 for other indications that the Court will pursue an "inno-
cence-related" standard in setting the scope of habeas. The two principles derived from Stone in
the preceding paragraphs-that it is a retreat from Brown and Fay vis-h-vis the standard for
cognizability of issues in habeas and that a proper standard is based on the relation of a claim to
the prisoner's innocence-are based on a single footnote of a long opinion, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
The text of the opinion is largely devoted to demonstrating that the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule should not be applied in habeas because its application there adds little to deterrence of
illegal searches. See 428 U.S. at 482-96. But the two principles enunciated in footnote 31 have
vitality beyond the fourth amendment context. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1086-88; The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 217-21 (1976). The Court itself has characterized Stone as
a retreat from Brown, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,79 (1977), and several members of the
Court have suggested other possible applications of the Stone rationale, see Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 508 n.l (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[a] strong case may be made that claims of
grand jury discrimination are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus after Stone"); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (principles of Stone should apply
to attempts to suppress reliable evidence obtained through unlawful custodial interrogation);
Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, 1111-16 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting to denial of certio-
rari) (Stone supports habeas review of the evidence under a reasonable doubt standard). See also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502-15 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining why Stone must
be read as an interpretation of the habeas statute and not merely as a decision about the uses of
the exclusionary rule); id at 517-18 (discussing possible applications of Stone to other rights).
1313Vol. 78:1307]
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cognizability of issues in habeas and in asserting that a proper standard
must be grounded in the relation of a claim to the prisoner's innocence,
may be, as Justice Brennan said in his dissent, "a harbinger of future
eviscerations of the habeas statutes."'  But Justice Brennan is hardly
correct in claiming that "[tjhere is no foundation in the language or
history of the habeas statutes for discriminating between types of con-
stitutional transgressions. '4 Although the statutory language furnishes
no such foundation, the Supreme Court has often distinguished among
constitutional issues in habeas,46 and its decisions have not always ex-
panded the range of issues that may be raised.47
These aspects of Stone are important in considering the reasons
why different habeas rules might be devised for free speech claims.
They also reflect the more general principle that a habeas court, unlike
an appellate tribunal, may differentiate among rights. This principle,
rooted in the historic function of the writ to remedy confinements that
were "affronts to the conscience" and "intolerable restraints," was
nearly forgotten in the years after Brown and Fay. Stone reaffirms the
distinctive nature of the writ while opening the way for a more complex
approach to habeas and, particularly, a more liberal approach to first
amendment habeas.
Stone, Wainwright and Francis may also signal the beginnings of a
general cutback in the availability of collateral relief which could pose
dangers for first amendment as well as procedural habeas. If the Court
strongly values the interests of federalism and finality that led to limits
on habeas in these cases, it might decide to extend the Stone rule to all
constitutional claims and thereby deny habeas whenever the issue has
been fully and fairly considered in the state court. In view of this possi-
bility it is imperative to identify the special features of free speech
claims that would support an exception for these claims from any gen-
eral cutback. The differences justifying a more liberal treatment of
habeas claims based on free speech as opposed to procedural grounds
are addressed in Part II.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT/CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY
There are three reasons why free speech issues should be handled
differently than procedural questions in habeas corpus. First, free
speech rights are more closely connected to the innocence standard
44. 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id at 522.
46. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1977) (dictum); Developments 1045-55.
47. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-58, 271-75 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
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enunciated in Stone than are procedural fights. Second, first amend-
ment rights are particularly vulnerable to insensitive state procedures,
broadly worded state laws and the majoritarian pressures encountered
by most state judges. The adequate defense of free speech rights may
require a federal forum at some point, and a petition for habeas corpus
is often the only means available for obtaining such a forum. Third,
the finality interests that work against habeas are substantially weaker
in the typical free speech case than in the typical criminal procedure
case.
A. Free Speech and the Basic Justice of the Prisoner's Incarceration.
In its retreat from Brown and Fay, the Court in Stone identified
the standard for granting habeas relief-that the prisoner suffer an in-
tolerable restraint or that his incarceration be contrary to basic jus-
tice-with the question of the prisoner's guilt or innocence. Because
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule obstructs rather than aids the
search for truth, such claims cannot be raised on habeas. Unlike the
search and seizure claim advanced in Stone, rights such as the right to
counsel or the right not to be convicted by use of a coerced confession
help assure more accurate determinations of fact. Even so, they are not
as closely connected to innocence as are first amendment claims. If a
prisoner is released because the statute as applied to his conduct vio-
lates the first amendment, it necessarily follows that he is innocent. If
he is released on a procedural ground, however, it follows only that his
rights have been violated; the determination of guilt or innocence must
await a new trial. This difference between the consequences of a suc-
cessful petition in a speech case and that in a procedure case warrants
the conclusion that a first amendment habeas case bears more directly
on innocence than does a procedural claim.48
Two objections might be made to this analysis. The first, based on
the presumption of innocence, can be disposed of with dispatch. Al-
though a prisoner freed on a procedural ground is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, he is not in the same position as the successful free
speech petitioner because he can still be found guilty of the crime at a
later trial. The successful first amendment petitioner, on the other
hand, cannot be found guilty.
The second and more significant objection is that the relationship
of a constitutional right to the prisoner's innocence is not always an
48. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting) (procedural/substantive distinction drawn with regard to prospective application of
new rules in habeas).
1315Vol. 78:13071
DUKE LAW JOURN4L
appropriate standard for evaluating whether a confinement meets the
historical, and always elusive, habeas test of being an "intolerable re-
straint," or carrying a "connotation of outrage," or offending "basic
justice."49 Thus, there are procedural rights, such as the right against
double jeopardy, that may be asserted on direct appeal even by a con-
cededly guilty defendant.5 0 A court may decide that in connection with
those rights the "intolerable restraint" standard could be met even if
the prisoner's claim were not related to innocence .5  The result of such
a development, however, would not be to diminish the close connection
between first amendment rights and the habeas standard. Innocence
would probably remain at the core of the habeas test,52 though the stan-
dard would likely become a bit more complex.53
The reason for drawing these distinctions between speech and pro-
cedural rights should not be misunderstood. The point is not that pro-
cedural claims are unrelated to the writ's function of remedying
intolerable restraints on liberty. Rather, the argument is only that first
amendment claims are more closely connected to that function than are
procedural claims and therefore may justifiably claim more solicitude
in habeas corpus proceedings.
B. The Fragility of First Amendment Rights.
The Supreme Court has surrounded the first amendment with an
array of protective devices designed to guarantee that free speech is not
undermined by imprecise laws or by heavy-handed procedures. 4 The
49. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
50. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
51. See Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 437
U.S. 19 (1978) (Stone not applicable to double jeopardy claim); Sedgwick v. Superior Court, 417
F. Supp. 386, 387 (D.D.C. 1976) (same); Cover & Aleinikoff 1093-94.
52. The Court seems to be committed to innocence as the root of the habeas standard. See
note 43 supra.
53. It should be noted that the issue whether the innocence standard is insufficiently complex
does not turn solely upon the importance attached to constitutional values other than protecting
the innocent. Even if it is agreed that innocence is "not the most fundamental interest served by
enforcement of constitutional claims," Wright & Sofaer, supra note I, at 907 n.43; see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 523-24 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the conclusion that non-innocence
related values should be pursued in habeas does not necessarily follow. The distinctions made
earlier between rights and means of enforcing rights, see note 7 supra, and between the functions
of habeas and appellate review, see text accompanying notes 13-36 supra, must be kept in mind.
The function of habeas is not to defend all constitutional values, despite the importance of those
values, but only to remedy egregious restraints on liberty. A tenable argument can be made that a
concededly guilty prisoner whose protection against double jeopardy has been violated is not sub-
ject to such a restraint. The important constitutional values at stake in a double jeopardy claim
might be adequately vindicated at trial, on appeal or in state habeas corpus proceedings.
54. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963);
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premise behind these devices is that first amendment rights are "deli-
cate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious to our society."55
Because "the line between unconditionally guaranteed speech and
speech that may be legitimately regulated is a close one," 56 "the threat
of sanctions may deter. . . [the exercise of first amendment rights] al-
most as potently as the actual application of sanctions, '5 7 and ordinary
procedures may prove insufficiently "sensitive" 58 to vindicate speech
interests fully.59
For example, a law that properly regulates some expression may
sweep too broadly and proscribe protected as well as unprotected
speech. In the ordinary run of cases a litigant may attack a statute only
as it applies to him.60 However, when a statute is challenged on first
amendment grounds, a litigant may, in proper circumstances, assert the
statute's overbreadth even if it is constitutional as applied to him.61
Moreover, the Court may strike down an overbroad law even if the
governmental interest served by it outweighs the infringement of
speech.62 The rationale for the doctrine is that the overbroad law might
have a chilling effect on protected speech and consequently must be
struck down at the first available opportunity.63 Another example of
the Court's sensitivity to first amendment liberties is the rule that a
court should make an independent determination about the obscenity
of offending materials, rather than deferring to the findings of a jury, a
state court, a United States Magistrate or to a guilty plea.'
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1374
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
55. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
56. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975); see Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (the line is "dim and uncertain").
57. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963); see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-
20 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
58. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). See also Monaghan, First Amendment "Due
Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66-71 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1961); Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 151-54 (1959).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
61. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951).
62. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
63. See First Amendment-Overbreadth 852-58.
64. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974) (making independent judgment on
obscenity); Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188-90 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (independent
judgment necessary in obscenity cases); Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1975)
(court must not accept guilty plea without independent review of materials to determine obscen-
ity); McKinney v. Parsons, 488 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974), appeal after remand, 513 F.2d 264, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 960 (1975) (court must independently review materials and not merely accept
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First amendment habeas corpus should be viewed as related to
these devices aimed at guaranteeing adequate protection for the free-
dom of speech. However, habeas differs from the other special protec-
tive devices for first amendment rights because it does not respond to a
single, identifiable need. The chilling effect provokes the overbreadth
doctrine; the bias or insensitivity of jurors makes independent review
necessary in obscenity cases. Broad habeas, on the other hand, reflects
a judgment that as a general matter first amendment rights will be ade-
quately protected only if free speech claims can be raised in an in-
dependent proceeding before a federal court. Underlying this
judgment is the perception that a federal court will likely be more sym-
pathetic to constitutional claims than the state courts65 and the proposi-
tion that there is less chance of an error resulting in a denial of
constitutional rights when a claim is examined by two court systems
than when it is heard by only one.66
These two principles have been advanced in support of broad
availability of federal habeas corpus generally. The distinctive fragility
of first amendment rights provides the justification for giving them in-
creased protection in habeas proceedings. Procedural rights are not so
delicate. A criminal defendant has a lawyer to tell him what his rights
are and ordinarily has every incentive either to exercise them or bar-
gain them away for a favorable settlement. 67  Efforts by the state to
inhibit the exercise of procedural rights are ordinarily visible enough to
permit their correction at trial or on appeal. On the other hand, a per-
son contemplating the exercise of first amendment rights in a way that
might run afoul of the criminal law, for example, by attending a mass
demonstration or taping a peace symbol to a flag, faces a hard choice.
U.S. Magistrate's determination of obscenity); Summerlin v. Sheriff, 350 F. Supp. 336, 339 (N.D.
Ohio 1972) ("an entire line of lower federal courts seems to have adopted a standard of mandatory
judicial review ofobscenity questions"); Monaghan, supra note 58, at 526-32 (jury's role should be
restricted in first amendment cases because "judges are less inclined to be affected by passion and
prejudice and more inclined to realize the importance of first amendment values").
65. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1045; Neuborne, The Myth a/Pariy, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105
(1977). But see Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977).
66. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1045-46 & n.60.
67. Procedural rights may sometimes be inhibited by state practice, as when the state seeks a
more severe sentence on reconviction following a successful appeal. The Court has recognized the
dangers such practices may pose for the exercise of procedural rights. Compare North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (vindictiveness may not play a part in resentencing) with Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24-28 (1973) (higher sentence on retrial acceptable ifjury not shown to
be motivated by vindictiveness and did not know of prior sentence). The fact remains, however,
that such inhibitions and efforts to remedy them are a relatively insignificant part of the law of
criminal procedure. Cf. Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808,
832-33 (1969) (procedural rights seldom chilled); First Amendment-Overbreadth 852 n.33 ("over-
breadth reasoning. . . is seldom encountered in cases involving the criminal process").
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He must decide between the tranquility of daily life that could be
maintained if he foregoes the exercise of those rights and the possibility
of arrest, the cost of bail and lawyer's fees, the consequences of a crimi-
nal conviction, the enmity of the community and other unpleasant im-
plications of expressive activity.6 8 It may seem more prudent to forego
the vigorous exercise of first amendment rights and to settle for more
conventional, albeit less effective, modes of expression.69 This chill
upon the exercise of free speech cannot be directly remedied in the
courts because the inhibited conduct never takes place and can never
be tested in court. Indeed, the chill is effective precisely to the extent
that it keeps individuals from going to court and fighting for their
rights.
In addition to the contextual differences between the circum-
stances in which speech and procedural rights must be asserted, the
institutional framework in which they must be vindicated further justi-
fies broader habeas relief for first amendment claims. From the pris-
oner's standpoint, the great advantage of federal habeas corpus is the
opportunity to obtain an independent federal review of his state court
conviction. The institutional differences between state and federal
courts lead him, as they lead most litigants who claim that state officials
have acted in violation of the federal constitution, to prefer a federal
forum. But these institutional differences appear to provide more sup-
port for first amendment than for procedural habeas. In the habeas
context, the relevant comparison is between the federal district courts
and the state appellate courts, for these are the two tribunals that would
review the work of the state trial court. The primary difference be-
tween the two is that federal judges are protected from majoritarian
pressures while state judges are not.70 As a result, federal courts are
68. See, e.g., Amsterdam 800-02, 840-42; FirstAmendment-Overbreadth 854-55.
69. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (expressive value of speech de-
pends on its emotional as well as its cognitive elements); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949) (speech "may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger"); sf Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1489-90 (1975) (expression must be controversial to be most
effective).
70. See Neuborne, supra note 65, at 1116 n.45, 1127-28. As Professor Neuborne points out,
id 1116 n.45, the other major difference between the federal habeas court and the state appellate
court is that the habeas court may take evidence and redetermine the facts relating to the constitu-
tional claim. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The importance of this feature of
habeas is hard to measure. Compare DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANN. REP., Table C-4 at 313 (1977) (2.7% of habeas cases go to trial) with Shapiro 336
(finding that some kind of evidentiary hearing was probably held in 33, or 12.8%, of 257 Massa-
chusetts habeas cases over a three-year period). It should be noted that many of the hearings
included in Professor Shapiro's count were unrelated to the merits. See Shapiro 346-47 & n.135
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likely to be more sympathetic to litigants presenting "issues which raise
strong political passions" 7' but may not prove superior in deciding
more mundane questions.
Most criminal procedure issues arise in the course of routine tri-
als.72 Only the rare case stirs much passion.73 In contrast, a criminal
case concerning first amendment rights will likely be highly publicized,
for the defendant may be a purveyor of pornography,74 a flag desecra-
tor75 or a demonstrator.76 Often the very reason he is on trial is a result
of or part of an effort to attract attention to himself or his cause, and
the reason for his arrest may be the community's disapproval of the
ideas he expresses, while similar modes of expression by others go un-
challenged.77  If majoritarian pressures ever influence judicial deci-
sions, they will be more likely to do so in first amendment cases than in
criminal procedure cases. Broader first amendment habeas might be
necessary to rectify errors resulting from those pressures. Persons may
be more likely to exercise their free speech rights (or what they believe
to be their rights) if they can be sure that a state conviction may be
challenged in a federal habeas court. Thus, the availability of broad
(one hearing solely concerned with procedural default), 350 & n.154 (seven hearings on exhaus-
tion of state remedies, two on bail and two on prison conditions or discipline). On habeas fact
finding in free speech cases, see text accompanying notes 90-94 infa.
71. See Neuborne, supra note 65, at 1128.
72. Consequently, the state trial judge is likely to be well versed in constitutional criminal
procedure. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (state courts have much expertise in
adjudicating fourth amendment claims); Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977)
("the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional law is espe-
cially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure claims, since they are dealt with on a daily
basis by trial level judges in- both systems").
73. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
74. E.g., Amato v. Divine, 558 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1977); Wasserman v. Municipal Court, 543
F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1976); McKinney v. Parsons, 513 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 960
(1975); Orito v. Powers, 479 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1973); Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606 (Ist Cir.),
ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970).
75. Eg., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Royal v. Rockingham County Superior
Court, 531 F.2d 1084 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); Cline v. Rockingham County
Superior Court, 502 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1974); Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Deeds v. Beto, 353 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
76. Eg., Thompson v. Gaffiiey, 540 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078
(1977); Arbeitman v. District Court of Vermont, 522 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); Squire v. Pace, 516
F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.
Ohio 1975); Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
77. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("my
brief experience on the Court has persuaded me that grossly disparate treatment of similar offend-
ers is characteristic of criminal enforcement of obscenity law"); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
574-76 (1974) (discussing selective enforcement of flag desecration statutes); Squire v. Pace, 380 F.
Supp. 269, 277-78 (W.D. Va. 1974), af'd, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975)
(discussing selective enforcement of disorderly conduct statute); Amsterdam 800-01 ("the mayor
and the chief of police.., would never be arrested if they picketed a courthouse").
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habeas in the free speech context can indirectly mitigate the distinctive
fragility of first amendment rights.
C. Federalism and Finality.
The fragility of freedom of speech is reason enough to seek greater
protection for speech rights than for criminal procedure rights in
habeas, but it cannot alone justify different rules for first amendment
claims. If the costs of first amendment habeas corpus litigation were
inordinate, expansion might be unwise and cutbacks warranted. In
fact, however, the costs of first amendment habeas are less than the
costs of procedural habeas. An examination of these costs supplies an-
other justification for a distinctive and liberal treatment of first amend-
ment habeas corpus petitions.
In Stone, the Court listed four societal values that are damaged by
collateral attack. Two of these, "the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources" and "the necessity of finality in criminal trials,"78
may be deemed finality interests. The other two, "the minimization of
friction between our federal and state systems of justice" and "the
maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of
federalism is founded,"79 are interests of federalism. Some intrusion on
federalism and finality interests is inevitable in any habeas corpus liti-
gation. But the damage to finality is substantially less when first
amendment issues are presented than when procedural claims are
made. Federalism interests are furthered whenever habeas is limited,
but federalism, taken alone, is not a strong basis for cutting the scope of
habeas in any context.
1. Finality. The interest in finality as a means of insuring the
most effective utilization of limited judicial resources requires little ex-
planation. "[I]f a job cau be well done once, it should not be done
twice."80 The point is not merely that relitigation costs money, but that
it may waste "the intellectual, moral, and political resources involved
in the legal system."' I Some of these resources are expended whenever
issues are relitigated in habeas. But when the prisoner is released on a
substantive ground, as is true in first amendment cases, the costs do not
include retrial.82
78. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
79. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
80. Bator 451.
81. Id
82. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
1321Vol. 78:1307]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
"The necessity of finality in criminal trials" is a more subtle value.
Finality is said to be essential to the effective operation of the criminal
law. If crime is to be deterred, punishment must be certain and not
tentative. If prisoners are to be reformed, they must at some point ac-
cept punishment and concentrate on becoming better citizens. The
granting of broad habeas relief encourages prisoners to look backward
at their trials and to deny (perhaps to themselves as well as to their
jailors) the justice of their imprisonment.13
Another reason that finality is important rests on the insight that
"[r]epose is a psychological necessity in a secure and active society."8 4
Quite apart from the need to help the prisoner to recognize that his
incarceration is just, our procedural doctrines should "give us repose,
• . . embody the judgment that we have tried hard enough and thus
may take it that justice has been done."18  Repose must be distin-
guished from complacency. It is not the "smug acceptance of injus-
tice," but rather a refusal to fall victim to "unreasoned anxiety" that
some error has been made. 6
Two other considerations also have been voiced. One is the practi-
cal difficulty of determining or redetermining facts in a habeas pro-
ceeding long after the events and of redetermining facts still later at a
new trial.8 7 The other is that "[i]t must prejudice the occasional merito-
rious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones."88 Because
so many habeas corpus petitions are frivolous and because the volume
of habeas corpus petitions is great, the quality of consideration given
each petition is diminished. According to Judge Friendly, this "may be
distasteful but no judge can honestly deny it is real."8 9
How strong are these interests in the first amendment context?
The last two can be disposed of in short order. First amendment cases
rarely require the redetermination of facts. Sometimes the facts are
disputed in a disorderly conduct case arising from a demonstration,9"
83. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Bator
452.
84. Bator 452.
85. Id
86. Id. 453.
87. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 383-84
(1964)).
88. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
89. Friendly 149.
90. Examination of forty-seven first amendment habeas cases reveals only one in which facts
found in the state courts were relitigated. Raby v. Woods, 440 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1971). In that
case a conviction for blocking traffic during the course of a demonstration was challenged on first
amendment grounds. The district court held a hearing, redetermined the facts and granted the
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but the question more often is the constitutionality of a statute, either
on its face9' or as applied to given conduct.92 For example, in obscen-
ity cases the issue is the application of constitutional standards to
materials held to be obscene by a state court. The habeas court may
examine the materials93 and compare them with similar materials, the
status of which has already been litigated,94 but these procedures
hardly create the practical fact-finding problems that give rise to con-
cem. The possibility that meritorious petitions will get lost in the shuf-
fle may be a reason for considering changes in habeas or for increasing
the number of federal judges. But if first amendment claims otherwise
merit distinctive treatment, they should be among the rights given most
careful consideration under any habeas system.
The state's interest in repose and in the effective enforcement of its
criminal law are powerful considerations militating against the broad
availability of habeas corpus because so few habeas petitions are suc-
cessful. It appears that under five percent of federal habeas petitions
are granted.95 Doubtless even fewer prisoners actually win release on
writ. The court of appeals reversed, criticizing the district court's "usurpation" of the jury's func-
tion. Id at 482.
Courts often hold evidentiary hearings in obscenity cases, but the purpose in such cases is to
examine the offending material and compare it with other materials in order to make an in-
dependent judgment as to its obscenity under constitutional standards. See text accompanying
notes 93-94 infra. Of course it is not entirely clear that the theoretical possibility of a factual
hearing is of much practical significance even in procedural cases. See note 70 supra.
91. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Moore v. Newell, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
906 (1975); Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 924 (1975);
Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
92. Eg., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237 (8th
Cir. 1976); Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 502 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1974); Epton v.
Nenna, 446 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971); Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F.
Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
93. Eg, Wasserman v. Municipal Court, 543 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1976); McKinney v. Parsons,
513 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 960 (1975);,Wenzler v. Pitchess, 359 F.2d 402 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); Simpson v. Spice, 390 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Wis. 1975);
Summerlin v. Sheriff, 350 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
94. E.g., Amato v. Divine, 558 F.2d 364, 365 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977); Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d
606, 607-08 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970).
95. See, e.g., DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN. REP.
132 (1971) (relief requested is not granted in 96% of habeas cases). Professor Shapiro conducted a
three-year study of habeas in Massachusetts. "Of the 257 cases studied, 10 (less then 4%) ended in
an order effectively discharging the petitioner from custody." Shapiro 340. For a number of other
petitioners, "state court postconviction processes had ground to a halt and the federal petition was
instrumental in getting them started again." Id 341. As he points out, habeas could serve this
latter function without its present intrusiveness into state interests in finality and federalism. See
id 369. Professor Shapiro's figures are for prisoners who were actually released. The Administra-
tive Office's figures show only whether federal relief was granted. The assumption that none of
the prisoners was retried or reconvicted would of course be unwarranted. See Friendly 148 n.25.
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retrial.96 As an argument against the broad availability of federal
habeas, the state's interest in repose is strengthened by these figures, for
if habeas only rarely results in release, repose can hardly be attacked as
a "smug acceptance of injustice," and the argument against repose
takes on the character of "unreasoned anxiety."' 97  Similarly, if few
prisoners are successful the state's interest in effective enforcement of
its criminal law and punishment of offenders takes on added weight.
Habeas may seem little more than a costly encumbrance that does no
one much good.
First amendment claims, however, are proportionately more suc-
cessful than habeas corpus petitions in general. In Professor Shapiro's
Massachusetts study, ten of 257 cases challenged the validity of statutes
on their faces or as applied. Six of these were successful; four of the six
were first amendment cases.98 My review of forty-seven first amend-
ment habeas cases decided since 1963 reveals that the petitioners were
successful in twenty-one cases, or over forty-four percent.99 In virtually
every one of these cases the court determined that the prisoner had to
go free rather than that a procedural error had occurred and that a new
trial had to be held. l"° This striking success rate may be a reflection of
In any event, Judge Friendly and Judge Wright also report a success rate of less than five per cent.
Id 148 n.24; Wright & Sofaer, supra note 1, at 899 n.16; see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 n.45
(1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,498 & n.11 (1953) (commenting on the low rate of success of
habeas petitions). Also instructive is Professor Reitz's study of habeas in the 1950s. Reitz, Federal
Habeas Corpus Pos/conviction Remedyfor State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461, 481-513, 525-
32 (1960). Thirty-five successful petitions were discovered through a study of reported cases. Id
481 & n.1 12. Interestingly there is not a single first amendment case among them. See id 525-32.
96. See note 95 supra.
97. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
98. I derive these figures from Shapiro 331 (ten challenges based on "unconstitutionality of
criminal statute, on its face or as applied"), id 340 ("In 3 of the [successful] cases, it was held that
the materials on which obscenity convictions had been based were constitutionally protected")
and id 340 n.103 (citing three other successful challenges to statutes on their faces or as applied,
one of which, Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (Ist Cir. 1972), aJ'd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), was a first
amendment vagueness case).
99. The cases are collected in the Appendix, infra. Many habeas cases go unreported, doubt-
less some first amendment cases among them. It might be argued that my figures, based on the
reported cases I have been able to find, are biased in favor of successful first amendment petitions
because a higher proportion of unsuccessful ones will be unreported. The validity of this argu-
ment cannot be determined in the absence of thorough examination of unreported cases. It is,
however, noteworthy that one of Professor Shapiro's successful first amendment habeas cases was
unreported. See Shapiro 340 n.102. In addition, my confidence in these figures is bolstered by
their rough consistency with Shapiro's results. Although it is not clear from his report what per-
centage of free speech claims were successful, we do know that there were ten challenges to the
validity of statutes. Six were successful, four of which were free speech cases. See note 98 supra
and accompanying text. Assuming all four unsuccessful cases were also first amendment attacks,
the success rate in the Massachusetts study for free speech challenges to statutes would be fifty
percent.
100. An exception is Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976), where the state was
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the majoritarian pressures on state judges in emotionally charged, free
speech cases. In light of these figures, repose and effective enforcement
of the criminal law are dramatically weaker values in the first amend-
ment context. Repose becomes complacency in the state's denial of
constitutional rights, and effective law enforcement often becomes en-
forcement of unconstitutional laws and punishment of innocent men.
In short, the list of finality interests developed by the opponents of
broad habeas simply do not apply with much force to first amendment
claims. The finality argument derives its force from the image it con-
jures of a prisoner who has been convicted of an ordinary crime that
has no constitutional overtones and who is most likely guilty. Such a
prisoner, however, is cognizant of the availability of habeas and is also
aware that some of his guilty friends have been granted new trials after
filing habeas petitions. Therefore, the prisoner avoids the "realization
• . . that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of reha-
bilitation."''  Instead, he continues to "look back with the view to res-
urrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation."' 2 The first
amendment prisoner, on the other hand, is most likely a pornographer,
a flag desecrator or a demonstrator. Many of these prisoners are assert-
ing issues relating not to the procedural purity of their trials but to the
constitutional immunity of their conduct, claims which are often suc-
cessful. The substantially weakened position of finality interests at
stake in such cases supplies another element in the justification for an
expansive approach to habeas in first amendment cases.
2. Federalism. The Court in Stone listed "the minimization of
friction between our federal and state systems of justice" and "the
maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of
federalism is founded"'1 3 as two societal values with which habeas con-
flicts. The Court also said it was unwilling to assume that state courts
would not adequately protect constitutional rights."° Earlier, concur-
ring in Schnecklotl v. Bustamonte,05 Justice Powell listed these same
interests in federalism'0 6 and said that the Court had "few more press-
ing responsibilities than to restore the mutual respect and the balanced
permitted to retry the prisoner under a proper constitutional standard. See Epton v. Nenna, 446
F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971) (writ denied; successful attack on jury instruc-
tion presumably would have resulted in new trial with proper instruction).
101. Bator 452.
102. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
103. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 259 (Powell, J., concurring)).
104. 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35; accord, Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977).
105. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
106. Id at 259 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sharing of responsibility between the state and federal courts.' 0 7 The
Court could help achieve that goal "without retreat from our inherited
insistence that the writ of habeas corpus retain its full vitality as a
means of redressing injustice" by refusing to entertain fourth amend-
ment habeas claims.'0
The goals of minimizing friction between federal and state courts
and of assuring that they share the responsibility for guaranteeing
rights would be served by restrictions on first amendment habeas just
as they are by cutbacks in the cognizability of fourth amendment or
other constitutional rights. Accordingly, there is no point in attempting
to draw distinctions between free speech and other rights with regard to
federalism. It should be noted, however, that the federalism argument
for restrictive habeas is not strong. The requirement that a prisoner
exhaust state remedies before petitioning for federal habeas assures
that the state will have an opportunity to enforce its laws and adjudi-
cate the constitutional issues in a case before the federal courts enter
the controversy. In this connection a useful contrast can be drawn be-
tween habeas corpus and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has se-
verely restricted the availability of injunctive relief against pending
state prosecutions on the ground that, save the rare case where the state
prosecution is in bad faith, "Our Federalism" demands that states be
permitted to enforce the criminal law without such interference.l0 9 At
the same time, courts have sometimes pointed to the availability of
habeas relief after state proceedings have run their course as a less in-
trusive federal remedy than injunctive relief for asserted violations of
constitutional rights.110
The positioning of habeas relief after rather than before state pro-
ceedings is related to another consideration that diminishes the force of
the federalism argument. Because state courts are guaranteed the first
opportunity to hear a prisoner's constitutional claims and because they
are not bound by the decisions of lower federal courts in habeas cases,
they retain a substantial role in defining and enforcing constitutional
rights. They can refuse to follow the decisions of those courts or can
follow them only narrowly. Their responses may influence future fed-
eral court decisions. This dialogue between state and lower federal
107. Id at 265 (Powell, J., concurring).
108. Id
109. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
110. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 513 n.10 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974); Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993, 994 n.1 (N.D. Ga.),
af'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1970); Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833, 835 n.4 (E.D. La. 1970),
af'd, 437 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1971).
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courts has been dubbed "dialectical federalism."' 1'
There is one final objection to using federalism as a major factor in
limiting the scope of habeas. Because any restrictions on habeas would
tend to minimize friction and preserve the balance between the state
and federal systems, the use of federalism as the sole criterion does not
provide for any limitations upon its use. Taken to its logical conclusion
it seems to require that no constitutional claim be cognizable in habeas
so long as the state court has given it a fair hearing.' 2 The Supreme
Court may not be willing to go that far in reshaping habeas." 3 But as
the test itself seems limitless, it is impossible to tell from one case to the
next just how it will affect the outcome. The danger is that courts will
use federalism as a screen behind which other-perhaps illegiti-
mate-reasons lurk, just as courts today sometimes seem to use the
vague abstention standards-"uncertainty of state law" and "difficult
constitutional question"-to rationalize abstention decisions that actu-
ally are based on the courts' preferred results on the merits.'14 It seems
justifiable to conclude that, while free speech claims cannot be distin-
guished from other habeas claims in terms of intrusions on the interest
in federalism, that interest unalloyed with finality or other considera-
tions militating against habeas is not a strong rationale for limiting the
availability of the writ in any context.
III. THE SCOPE OF FIRST AMENDMENT HABEAS
If the different functions of habeas and appellate review permit the
habeas court to handle some constitutional rights with greater solici-
tude than others, and if free speech issues can lay claim to more liberal
treatment than procedural rights receive, the remaining question that
requires attention is what distinctive rules and principles might be ap-
propriate in the first amendment context.
A. The Cognizability of First Amendment Issues on Habeas.
The Court's recent decisions in Wainwright, Francis and Stone,
cutting back the scope of the writ in pursuit of countervailing values of
finality and federalism, suggest that further limits upon habeas may be
forthcoming. In particular, the Stone rule, barring fourth amendment
claims where the state courts provide a fair opportunity to litigate them,
I 11. See Cover & Aleinikoff 1046-68.
112. See The Supreme Court, supra note 43, at 217-18.
113. But see text accompanying notes 116-24 infra.
114. See Field, TheAbstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. Rev. 590, 602 & nn.51-52 (1977);
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope ofthe Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 1071, 1135 & n.167 (1974).
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may foreshadow more general limits on the cognizability of claims on
petitions for habeas corpus. Should the Court extend Stone to other
constitutional claims, the distinctions drawn in Part II of this Article
between speech and procedural habeas would support the retention of
full review of first amendment issues even if habeas review is restricted
for procedural questions.
The practical significance of this point may be questioned. Cer-
tainly the "innocence" standard intimated in Stone would rarely pose a
threat to first amendment claims."15 There are, however, periodic ef-
forts in Congress to amend the habeas statute to provide for review
only when the state courts have failed fairly to consider a constitutional
claim.1 6 In addition, the innocence standard may prove unstable, and
Stone may be remembered not as the case that laid down an innocence
standard for determining whether an issue may be raised on habeas,
but as the case that began an effort by the Supreme Court to limit the
issues that may be raised.
Why may the innocence standard be unstable? As stated in Stone,
that standard would likely bar claims that obstruct the truth-finding
process, such as an assertion that Miranda warnings should have been
given in cases where the confession is concededly reliable.' ' It might
also apply to "truth-neutral" rights, such as double jeopardy and denial
of speedy trial, which operate to prevent prosecution of the defendant
regardless of his guilt or innocence. 1 8 Extension to these claims should
not be presumed too quickly, however. Such rights "contrast with the
exclusionary rule which merely blocks one avenue of proof but does
not alter our normal conception that this defendant, if guilty, should be
convicted."'' 9 In addition, even a Miranda claim can be related to the
115. First amendment overbreadth claims would likely be an exception to this generalization.
See text accompanying notes 193-219 infra.
116. See, e.g., H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., 101 CONG. REc. 4747 (1955); S. 917, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. 11189 (1968); S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2221
(1973), all of which are discussed in Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A Jurisdictional
Remedy, 63 IOWA L. REV. 392, 403-05 (1977). See also Note, Proposed Modflcation ofFederal
Habeas Corpusfor Prisoners-Re/orm or Revocation, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221 (1973).
117. See Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Stone applies to Miranda
claim); c Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Stone should
apply to claim of denial of right to counsel during custodial interrogation, where the evidence is
reliable).
118. But see Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 437
U.S. 19 (1978) (Stone not applicable to double jeopardy claim); Sedgwick v. Superior Court, 417
F. Supp. 386, 387-88 (D.D.C. 1976) (same). Of course, double jeopardy and speedy trial rights can
also safeguard the accuracy of the guilt-determining process by banning the use of stale evidence
and barring the prosecution from taking unfair advantage of the laws of probability through re-
peated trials.
119. Cover & Aleinikoff 1093.
1328 [Vol. 78:1307
HABEAS CORPUS
accuracy of the guilt-determining process, because it may form the ba-
sis for a claim that the confession was coerced. Though district courts
applying the standard may be able without too much trouble to draw
the necessary line between evidence of a Miranda violation and evi-
dence of coercion, they can hardly avoid addressing the petitions in the
first place. A prisoner with a Miranda claim would simply take care to
assert that the error impinged on the guilt-determining process. The
number of habeas petitions would not decline much, and most of the
harm to values of finality and federalism would remain."'z
The logic of the "guilt-innocence" inquiry could even lead to the
expansion of habeas. At present a habeas court will review the evi-
dence only to determine whether "any" evidence exists to support the
conviction-not whether the constitutionally mandated "reasonable
doubt" standard has been met.121 But such limited review of the evi-
dence is difficult to reconcile with the premise that the purpose of
habeas is to assure that innocent persons are not imprisoned.12 2 Ex-
panded review of evidence would, of course, further intrude upon the
finality and federalism interests that so impressed the Court in Stone,
Wainwright and Francis.
If the Court is sufficiently committed to strengthening those val-
ues, it will be unsatisfied with an innocence standard that may increase
the costs of habeas and that certainly will not diminish them signifi-
cantly. And if it is strongly committed to the proposition that state
courts are adequate protectors of federal rights, the logic of its convic-
tions may well drive it to overrule Brown and revert to Frank v.
Mangum,123 which held that no claim may be heard on habeas unless
120. As is readily apparent from the low success rate of habeas applications, see note 95 supra
and accompanying text, the costs of habeas are best measured not in terms of the small number of
prisoners released but in terms of the large numbers of petitions filed. If, in its application to other
rights, Stone merely results in a recasting of habeas petitions to allege some defect in the guilt-
determining process it will have little impact on the number of petitions filed. Cf. Cover &
Aleinikoff 1078-86; Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: ProceduralDefaults byReasonably Incom-
petent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REv. 341, 430-39, 448 (1978) (both articles suggest that the Court's
strict standard for procedural default enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), will
result in more claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
121. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); McLindon v. Warden, 575 F.2d
108, 111 (7th Cir. 1978).
122. See Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, 1111-16 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting to
denial of certiorari):
[A] federal habeas court asked to determine whether the evidence in a state prosecution
was sufficient would be discharging the principal function underlying its jurisdic-
tion- determining whether a defendant's custody is in violation of federal constitutional
law. And the question whether a defendant has been convicted without sufficient cause
is hardly irrelevant to innocence. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 [(1976)].
429 U.S. at 1115; see Cover & Aleinikoff 1095-1100.
123. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
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the state court lacked jurisdiction or failed fairly to consider the is-
sue. 124
The prospect is not farfetched. The Court has already "limited"
Fay,125 the cornerstone of modern habeas law, and Brown would be an
easy target on technical grounds. The opinions in Brown merely as-
serted that habeas corpus was available for all constitutional claims
and cited the statute.'l2  The Court did not explain why the statute was
being read differently from past interpretations.2 7 Fay supplied a his-
torical and theoretical rationale for Brown. But this dictum from Fay
may be considered less persuasive now that Fay has been questioned
on the issue of procedural default. If Brown were overruled, the Court
might well be persuaded that the costs of habeas to finality interests
applied equally regardless of the nature of the right asserted by the
petition.128 The discussion in Part II was an effort to show not only
that this conclusion is unwarranted, but also that there are other rea-
sons-the close connection of speech claims to the historical function of
the writ and the distinctive fragility of freedom of speech-for carving
out an exception for free speech claims.'29 Accordingly, first amend-
ment claims should remain fully cognizable on petitions for habeas
corpus even if review of other claims is limited to issues not fairly con-
sidered by the state court.
B. Free Speech and the Incidents of Habeas: Prospectivity, Custody,
Exhaustion and Procedural Default.
1. General Considerations. A writ of habeas corpus will not is-
124. See Bator 483-93.
125. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 72, 85 (1977).
126. 344 U.S. at 447, 464 (opinion of Reed, J.); id at 500, 507-08, 513 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.).
127. Bator 500-01.
128. This is the assumption of Professor Bator throughout his article. See Stone, 428 U.S. at
522-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, supra note 43, at 217 ("The general costs of
federal habeas corpus review noted by the [Stone] Court. . . apply with equal force in all habeas
cases" (citation omitted)).
129. It may be argued that since a general return to Frank would abandon the Stone "inno-
cence-related" standard, first amendment claims could no longer rely on their close connection
with innocence as a basis for preferred treatment. But rejecting the Stone test in favor of some-
thing more restrictive does not require that the Court reach that conclusion. In recognition of the
historical role of the writ to remedy intolerable restraints and do basic justice, and the premise that
confinement of an innocent person is perhaps the best example of an intolerable restraint, the
Court could make an exception for claims, such as most first amendment challenges, whose vindi-
cation would necessariy result in a finding that the prisoner was innocent. It is noteworthy that
habeas for federal prisoners has been available for attacking the constitutionality of the statute
underlying the conviction as far back as Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See Amsterdam,
supra note 87, at 384 n.30.
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sue unless the petitioner is in custody, has exhausted his state remedies
and has not committed an inexcusable procedural default in the state
courts. Moreover, a change in constitutional law may or may not be
made available to persons placed in custody and tried before the
change. In this section the rules governing these matters are examined.
In some instances the rules already in effect implicitly recognize the
distinctiveness of first amendment habeas. It is suggested that other
rules might justifiably be recast in order to better accommodate free
speech claims.
These incidents of habeas will be discussed in terms of the criteria
developed in Part II. The close relationship of free speech claims to the
function of the writ to remedy unjust restraints on liberty130 and the
fragility of first amendment rights131 support more liberal rules for
those rights with regard to the incidents of habeas. The lesser intru-
sions of first amendment habeas upon finality interests 32 and the
weakness of a broad federalist interest in avoiding any federal interfer-
ence with state criminal processes 33 generally support more relaxed
rules.
Since different values are involved to different degrees in the vari-
ous incidents of habeas corpus, the state interests in finality and in fed-
eralism are stronger arguments for giving a limited scope to some
incidents of habeas than to others. For example, the restrictive rules on
exhaustion of state remedies and on procedural default reflect a con-
crete interest in maintaining the integrity of the state's trial and appel-
late processes and not merely the Stone Court's protean interest in
limiting all collateral federal intrusions into the state criminal adjudica-
tion process. Similarly, the state's finality interest is stronger when the
issue is whether a new constitutional standard should be applied retro-
actively in habeas to free a prisoner confined pursuant to a conviction
that was free of error when rendered.
2. Prospectivity. The prospectivity issue is posed by a hypothet-
ical case: A and B are convicted of crimes. After A's conviction is final
but while B's case is still on appeal, the Supreme Court makes a new
rule of constitutional law that would render both convictions invalid.
The new rule will apply on B's appeal. A files a habeas petition, claim-
ing he should be released under the new standard.
Should the new rule apply to this case? Two courts of appeals
recently addressed this issue in the course of deciding obscenity habeas
130. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 54-69 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 80-102 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 103-14 supra.
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cases that were tried under the Roth-Memoirs test. 134 The prospectivity
issue, important to the reasoning but not strictly necessary to the deci-
sion of either case, was whether the habeas petitioner should be given
the benefit, if any, of the Supreme Court's latest rulings on obscenity
announced in Miller v. California.'35 In other decisions the Court had
said that on direct appeal defendants would be given the benefit of the
new standards. 136 In McKinney v. Parsons,37 the Fifth Circuit stated
that "in the spirit" of those rulings, it would extend the benefit of the
new rules to habeas petitions. In Amato v. Divine,131 the Seventh Cir-
cuit pointed out that the Supreme Court, in holding the new rules effec-
tive on direct appeal, had emphasized that new rules customarily were
applied on appellate review. The Amato court drew the inference that
the benefit of the new rules should not extend to habeas petitions.'
39
The Amato court was right in concluding that new rules applicable
on direct review need not be extended to habeas petitions. The func-
tional differences between collateral attack and appeal, as well as the
intrusions of habeas upon values of federalism and finality, support a
different approach to prospectivity in the habeas context.' 40 As a prac-
tical matter, restricting a new holding to prospective application on
habeas would avoid use of the rule to release large numbers of prison-
ers whose trials were held years before the new decision was an-
nounced, a point that might make it easier for the new rule to gain wide
acceptance. But the court's further dictum that a new first amendment
ruling would not apply in a habeas corpus proceeding neglects the close
relation of first amendment (and other substantive) rights to the basic
justice of the prisoner's incarceration as well as the lesser finality costs
134. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). See generally Kalven, The Metaphysics ofthe Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT
REv. 1; Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 Y A L.J. 1364 (1966).
135. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
136. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 196-97 (1977).
137. 513 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. United States ex rel. Williams v. Preiser, 497 F.2d
337, 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974) (holding that a new constitutional rule limit-
ing state regulation of abortion would be applied to free habeas petitioner convicted before the
new decision).
In Wasserman v. Municipal Court, 543 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1976), the court held that the Miller
test should be applied even when it diminishes constitutional protection. The decision is plainly
incorrect, as a person could not have fair warning at the time of his acts that the Roth-Memoirs
test would later be made more restrictive. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (direct
appeal). That Wasserman arose in habeas is irrelevant to the issue of fair warning.
138. 558 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1977).
139. Id at 365.
140. Perhaps the most forceful statements of this position are to be found in Justice Harlan's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) and
in Mishkin, Foreword- The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process ofTime and Law, 79
HARV. L. REv. 56, 77-102 (1965).
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where first amendment rights are at issue. A new procedural rule may
bear only a tenous relationship to the prisoner's guilt or innocence and
the justice of his incarceration. The costs to finality may be too great to
warrant its application to his case. 14 1 But a new substantive rule "repre-
sents the clearest instance where finality interests should yield."42 Be-
cause a man confined pursuant to a now invalid substantive rule is
unquestionably innocent under current standards, his incarceration is
indisputably contrary to basic justice. In addition, "issuance of the writ
on substantive due process grounds entails none of the adverse collat-
eral consequences of retrial,"' 143 such as expenditure of resources and
difficulties in relitigating the factual guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant, that often add to finality costs in the procedural context. The
McKinney rule, applying new holdings retroactively in free speech
cases when they benefit the petitioner, recognizes these distinctive fea-
tures of first amendment habeas and seems the better approach to the
retroactivity question.
3. Custody. In its early days the whole function of the writ of
habeas corpus was to require the respondent jailor to produce his pris-
oner before the court.'" It was the incarceration of persons without
legal cause that inspired the transformation of habeas from "a procedu-
ral device to facilitate medieval litigation' 45 into "the best remedy
available for those who considered that they had been unlawfully im-
prisoned by the crown."' 146 It is the tangible restraint placed on liberty
by prison walls that led Professor Chafee to describe habeas as "the
most important human right in the constitution."' 147 Yet the custody
requirement has grown steadily more attenuated in the last twenty
years.
At one time the custody requirement was met only by "tangible
physical restraints."' 48 Confinement to the city limits, 4 9 or release.on
bail, 150 on parole,' 51 or on probation was not sufficient. Nor was the
141. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
142. Id at 693.
143. Id
144. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 402; Developments 1072.
145. D. MEADOR, supra note 18, at 3.
146. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 114 (1938).
147. Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143, 143
(1952).
148. Developments 1073.
149. See Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
150. See Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920).
151. See Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (denying certiorari on grounds of mootness).
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writ available after a jail sentence had expired.152 In recent years, how-
ever, the Court has held that physical restraint is not necessary for
habeas jurisdiction. Prisoners on parole 153 or released on their own re-
cognizance awaiting execution of sentence 54 have been deemed to be
"in custody." If an application for habeas is made while the prisoner is
in custody, the case is not mooted by his subsequent unconditional re-
lease if there remain sufficient collateral consequences of his convic-
tion. 155
. The historical function of the custody requirement was to distin-
guish those restraints on liberty deemed serious enough to warrant the
extraordinary relief afforded by habeas. The Court's recent decisions
signal the abandonment of that ancient role. 156 Yet courts have contin-
ued to apply the custody rule where even minimal restraints are not
present. In recent first amendment cases, for example, a fifty dollar
fine, a twenty-five dollar fine and a lack of collateral consequences fol-
lowing completion of a sentence were deemed insufficient to meet the
custody requirement. 157 The courts' refusal to abandon the remnants
of the custody requirement' 58 even though it no longer performs its
original function is due to their reluctance to empty the statutory lan-
guage of its last bit of content. In view of the Supreme Court's consis-
tent refusal to permit the habeas statutes to interfere with its own
judgments about the proper scope of habeas, this concern seems mis-
placed. 159
There may be another reason for the tenacity of the custody re-
quirement. That rule is not historically or logically connected with
152. See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) (per curiam).
153. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
154. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
155. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). See generally Developments 1074-79.
156. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 353-54 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the result); f HART & WECHSLER 1508 (once physical restraint is abandoned as the test for
custody it may be impossible to draw meaningful distinctions between custody and no-custody
situations). The break with history is discussed in Oaks, supra note 26, at 468-72.
157. Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977) (writ denied for mootness be-
cause sentence ended with insufficient collateral consequences); Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) ($50 fine); Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) ($25 fine).
158. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1978) (fugitive not in "custody" and
therefore may not petition for habeas corpus).
159. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1977) (dictum); Developments 1072. The
Court's readiness to interpret the habeas statute as it pleases also furnishes the answer to the
objection that since custody is a statutory requirement, the Court may not set different standards
ofcustody for different rights. Thus, under the statute the writ extends to all prisoners "in custody
in violation of the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976). Under Stone, the content of the
latter five words seemingly depends on the constitutional right at issue. Surely the first two words
should be capable of similar flexibility.
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finality and federalism. In the century or so that the writ has been
available to attack the judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction,
however, the requirement has served to restrict the use of the writ for
the purpose of attacking such judgments and thereby has somewhat
limited the intrusions of habeas upon those interests. Perhaps the con-
temporary custody rule is best viewed as a means of providing an extra
measure of protection for finality and federalism. If so, then there are
grounds for distinguishing first amendment from procedural habeas.
Not only are the costs to those values minimal in the free speech con-
text, but the fragility of first amendment rights and their close connec-
tion to the writ's historical role of doing basic justice are also strong
counterweights to the values of finality and federalism. In view of
these considerations, a persuasive argument can be made that the cus-
tody requirement should be met by conviction alone in the first amend-
ment context.
160
4. Exhaustion. In contrast to custody, the requirement of ex-
haustion was a relative latecomer to the law of habeas corpus. Not
until 1886, in Exparte Royall,16 1 did the Court require a prisoner to
exhaust state remedies before he could assert his claims on federal
habeas. The explanation for the Royall rule is straightforward. There
was no federal habeas for state prisoners until the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867.162 In addition, so long as habeas courts considered only the
validity of executive detention and the jurisdictional competency of
committing courts, there was no occasion to examine prisoners' claims
that their constitutional rights had been violated. Since the federal
court would not address these issues on a petition for habeas corpus
anyway, it made no difference whether a state court had done so. But
when the Court began to hear constitutional claims on their merits,
some state criminal defendants sought to circumvent state criminal
processes by filing habeas applications before trial or appeal. 163 In or-
der to avoid "unnecessary conflict[s] between courts equally bound to
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution,"'' 64 the exhaus-
160. Cf. Cantrell v. Folsom, 332 F. Supp. 767 (M.D. Fla. 1971). This case began when habeas
proceedings were brought in federal court. The city then moved in state court to vacate the con-
victions, apparently for the purpose of blocking federal court adjudication of the constitutionality
of the vagrancy ordinance under which the convictions had been obtained. The district court,
finding there was a threat of future prosecutions, permitted the petitioners to proceed as a class for
a declaration that the statute was invalid. Their suit was successful.
161. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). See generally Developments 1093-1103.
162. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385. See generally Mayers, supra note 26.
163. See, e.g., Hillegas v. Sams, 349 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966); Amsterdam 884-88.
164. Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
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tion requirement was instituted.
The exhaustion requirement, then, is a way of protecting the con-
crete interest of federalism in the integrity and effectiveness of state
criminal and appellate processes 65 and is unrelated to the nature and
purposes of the writ.' 66 It guarantees that states will be able to admin-
ister their criminal laws without interference from the federal courts
prior to the termination of the state adjudication process. The price of
this concession to federalism is paid by the prisoner. Federal attention
to his claim is delayed, and invalid confinement may be prolonged. 67
This interest of federalism in maintaining the effectiveness and integ-
rity of state criminal processes is more compelling than the Stone
Court's mutable federalist interest in avoiding any intervention. As a
result, the case for maintaining a strict exhaustion requirement even in
first amendment cases may be stronger than it is for maintaining strict
rules in connection with cognizability, custody or prospectivity.
Because of the fragility of first amendment rights, it has been ar-
gued that exhaustion should not be required in free speech cases, 68
especially where the state prosecution might intimidate others from ex-
ercising their first amendment rights.' 69 In such cases, federal habeas
would be available to test the constitutionality of the statute, on its face
or as applied, before the state trial. Deciding the merits of this proposal
entails a choice of values between the more secure protection of first
amendment rights achieved by lifting the exhaustion requirement and
the state interest in administering the criminal law and adjudicating
constitutional claims in its own courts before federal intervention. In
view of its repeated references to federalism as a bar to injunctive relief
against pending state criminal proceedings, even where first amend-
ment claims are made,17 0 the Supreme Court would likely reject the
proposal.
Even if the proposal is not adopted, another principle of exhaus-
tion law assures that the costs of exhaustion will be relatively insignifi-
cant in many speech cases. Sentences for crimes under statutes that
165. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-92 (1973); Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir-
cuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1972); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
166. See Amsterdam 884-86; Developments 1094.
167. See Developments 1097.
168. See Amsterdam 898, 904-06.
169. See Developments 1100-01.
170. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 163 (1943); f Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 551 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ex-
haustion requirement is a more appropriate means of recognizing state interest in controlling its
criminal processes than is barring claim because of procedural default).
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raise first amendment problems are typically short. In the absence of a
special rule, a short sentence would likely expire before the prisoner
had exhausted state remedies. Upon release he would be deprived of
an opportunity to present his claims in habeas unless there were suffi-
cient collateral restraints upon him to meet the custody requirement.171
In any event, the prisoner would be deprived of much of the benefit of
habeas if he were required to serve his jail term before filing his peti-
tion. To preserve the habeas remedy where the sentence is short, fed-
eral courts have deemed the exhaustion requirement satisfied in such
cases unless the state allows post-conviction bail while the prisoner
goes forward in the state courts.' 72 This principle is not limited to first
amendment claims but may have its most significant impact in such
cases. Examination of forty-seven first amendment habeas cases
reveals that the applicants were often released pending exhaustion of
state remedies.' 73 Thus, one effect of the rule on short-sentence exhaus-
tion is to lessen the petitioner's exhaustion costs in first amendment
habeas cases.
5. Procedural Default. Suppose a criminal defendant fails to
object before trial, as state law requires, to the racial composition of the
grand jury that indicted him, or fails, again in contravention of state
law, to make contemporaneous objection to the admission of a confes-
sion at trial, or fails properly to raise some other constitutional claim.
Under state law, review of these claims is forever barred by failure to
comply with the procedural rules. So long as the procedural rules are
171. Of course, if the argument prevails that the custody requirement should be satisfied in
first amendment habeas corpus claims by a showing of conviction alone, then this consideration
standing alone would require no special rule. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
172. See, e.g., In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962); Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 33 (7th
Cir. 1971); Dawkins v. Crevasse, 391 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1968); Greene v. City of Orlando, 313 F.
Supp. 583, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Amsterdam 895-96, 898-99; Developments 1100; Vf. Hensley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 352 (1973) (dictum) (district court may order prisoner's release
pending consideration of his habeas claim).
173. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 571 (1974); Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237,
238 (8th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Crevasse, 415 F.2d 550, 550 n.l (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 909 (1970); Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10, 11-12 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Royal v. Rockingham
County Superior Court, 397 F. Supp. 260, 261 (D.N.H. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d
1084 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976); Simpson v. Spice, 390 F. Supp. 1271, 1272 (E.D.
Wis. 1975); Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Squire v. Pace, 380
F. Supp. 269, 280 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff"d, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975);
Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 367 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 502
F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1974); Summerlin v. Sheriff, 350 F. Supp. 336, 337 (N.D. Ohio 1972). But see
Bloss v. State of Michigan, 421 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court erred in granting bail
pending state court appeal); Simpson v. Spice, 318 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ($10,000 bail not
excessive in obscenity case); Gf Goodman v. Kohl, 456 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1972) (petitioner must
exhaust state court remedies as to bail before pursuing federal habeas for release on bail).
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constitutionally valid, the issues are also barred on direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. 7 4
Does the petitioner's procedural default bar him from raising the
claim in habeas? Because habeas is an entirely separate proceeding un-
related to the trial in which the default took place, the power of the
habeas court to hear such issues is fairly well-settled. 75 The harder
question is whether the power should be exercised. In Fay the prisoner
had failed to appeal his state conviction. By the time he filed his
habeas petition the deadline for appeal had passed, so his failure to
exhaust became a procedural default. 76 The issue was whether failure
to preserve the claim in the state courts would bar collateral review.
The Court held that the petition would be barred only if the failure to
appeal amounted to a "deliberate by-passing" of state processes. It did
not limit the deliberate-bypass standard to failure to appeal but said
that all procedural defaults would be tested by that rule. The deliber-
ate-bypass standard required a "considered choice" by the defendant to
try to circumvent state adjudication of the claim and was not satisfied
where the failure to assert the claim was inadvertent.'7
Thirteen years later, in Francis v. Henderson,7 1 the Court ruled
that failure to meet the state rule requiring objection before trial to
grand jury composition would bar the claim on a habeas corpus peti-
tion unless the petitioner could show "cause" for failing to raise the
issue and "prejudice" resulting from the alleged constitutional viola-
tion. 179 In Wainwright, the Court held similarly with regard to a con-
temporaneous objection requirement. In neither of these cases did the
Court explain the content of the "cause" and "prejudice" standard or
indicate whether the new rule would be applied to all claims. Instead,
it left "open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of
174. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-52 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
429 (1963); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
175. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538
(1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425 (1963). But see id at 448 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("federal
courts have no power, statutory or constitutional, to release the respondent ... because his cus-
tody. . . does not violate any federal rights, since it is pursuant to a conviction whose validity
rests upon an adequate and independent state ground which the federal courts are required to
respect") (emphasis in original).
176. See 372 U.S. at 394. See also Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(describing how failure to exhaust state remedies can become procedural default).
177. See 372 U.S. at 439.
178. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
179. Id; Sf Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (holding that a petitioner who had been
tried in prison clothes was not denied his right to be tried in civilian clothes when his lawyer failed
to object at trial); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (federal habeas); see also HART &
WECHSLER 256-58 (Supp. 1977).
1338 [Vol. 78:1307
HABEAS CORPUS
the 'cause' and 'prejudice' standard."'180 The Wainwright Court did ac-
knowledge that the new rule "limited" Fay,8" presumably to cases in-
volving a failure to appeal subsequent to trial.'82 Like the exhaustion
requirement, the standards of procedural default announced in Francis
and Wainwright are a means of respecting the federalist interest in the
integrity and effectiveness of state procedural rules.'83 Unlike the ex-
haustion requirement, they do not merely affect the timing of federal
habeas; they bar it altogether.
84
The impact of Francis and Wainwright upon first amendment
habeas will remain uncertain until the Court provides a more "precise
definition" of its cause and prejudice standard. There is reason to be-
lieve, however, that its impact will be minimal. Of the forty-seven
cases that could be found presenting federal habeas corpus petitions
based on first amendment claims, the procedural default issue was
raised in only three. In no case was procedural default a bar to the
habeas proceeding. In two cases, the asserted default was failure to
raise a first amendment argument on appeal.185 At least so long as Fay
remains the law on that point, procedural default will have little impact
in the first amendment context. 86
The opinions in Francis and Wainwright suggest that Fay may
well survive on the issue of failure to appeal, at least where a substan-
tive rather than a procedural ground is advanced in habeas. Those two
decisions were motivated by concern for strong state interests in the
effectiveness and integrity of the procedural rules at issue. The Court
in Francis stressed the importance of the state rule regarding grand jury
objections in accommodating the defendant's right to a properly consti-
tuted grand jury and the state's interest in trying him for the crime as
soon as possible. Determining the merits of the grand jury claim could
prove difficult long after the events, as could retrial many years after
the crime. Prompt assertion of the grand jury claim would avoid all
these problems.8 7 In Wainwright the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the contemporaneous objection rule to the effective and effi-
cient administration of the criminal justice system. The rule helps
180. 433 U.S. at 87.
181. Id at 85.
182. See id at 88 n.12.
183. See id at 88-90; Francis, 425 U.S. at 539-42.
184. See Francis, 425 U.S. at 551 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Severson v. Duff, 318 F. Supp.
17, 19, opinion on the merits, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1970). The other procedural default case is
Epton v. Nenna, 446 F.2d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971) (failure to request
jury instruction on proper standard for first amendment privilege).
186. The impact of procedural default in general may be insignificant. See Shapiro 346-48.
187. 425 U.S. at 540-41.
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correct errors at an early stage, avoids retrial and assures the perception
of a trial "as a decisive and portentous event."' 8
Where the procedural default is failure to raise an issue on appeal,
the state courts are deprived of an opportunity to decide the claim, but
the kind of strong federalist interest in a procedural rule that impressed
the Court in Francis and Wainwright is absent. If the issue is one of
substantive law, first amendment or otherwise, there will probably be
no retrial, so the finality costs of allowing the claim will be less than in
the case of a procedural challenge. Moreover, there will be no incen-
tive for a defense attorney to withhold a claim in the state court in the
hope of getting a more favorable forum in federal court, a concern
mentioned by the Court in Wainwright in support of its cause and
prejudice rule.'89 Such an incentive could only be present when a de-
termination of fact is necessary to adjudication of the claim and the
lawyer wishes to assure that the federal court will not defer to the state
court determination. On issues of substantive law or of the application
of law to fact, federal courts do not defer to state court determinations
in any event, so there is no incentive not to raise such issues in state
courts. Thus, procedural defaults respecting legal issues nearly always
will be inadvertent. As noted earlier, first amendment cases generally
present either issues of law or of the application of law to fact; the facts
are rarely disputed.'
In terms of the criteria developed in Part II, then, the interests of
federalism and finality in a strict procedural default rule are weaker for
substantive claims that have not been raised on appeal than for the
types of procedural default addressed in Wainwright and Francis. Ac-
cordingly, a more relaxed rule can be justified. This rationale for
preserving Fay for failure to raise substantive claims on appeal is not
limited to the first amendment context. Nor would such an approach
guarantee that procedural default would never bar a first amendment
claim. 9 ' A broader exception for first amendment cases would have to
188. 433 U.S. at 90.
189. See id at 89-90.
190. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
191. An example is Epton v. Nenna, 446 F.2d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948
(1971), where the asserted default, not addressed by the court of appeals, was failure to request a
jury instruction on the proper test for first amendment privilege. There is, however, at least one
other type of procedural default on substantive issues that might fit within the rationale developed
in the text for maintaining Fay for failures to appeal. That situation is where a particular first
amendment defense is not raised at all in the state courts. Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576-
77 (1974) (dictum rejecting the state's claim that the petitioner had failed to present to the state
courts his argument that the statute was facially vague); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 n. 1
(1972) (petitioner had failed to present to state courts his claim that the statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied). The considerations favoring a relaxed procedural default rule in the appeal
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be based on a judgment that the fragility of first amendment rights and
the close, connection of free speech claims to the basic justice of the
incarceration justify a general deviation from strict procedural default
rules in spite of the competing interests in finality and federalism. 192
C. Overbreadth Review.
Perhaps the most vexing question in first amendment habeas is
whether overbreadth attacks should be permitted. The overbreadth
doctrine has already been briefly discussed in connection with the fra-
gility of first amendment rights. 193 It is a departure from the rule that a
litigant may attack the constitutionality of a statute only as it applies to
him and not on the basis of hypothetical unconstitutional applications
to others. The Supreme Court has permitted such challenges in first
amendment cases because the exercise of first amendment rights could
be chilled by the existence of the statute. For that reason it is deemed
essential to strike down the law in the first available case, even if the
particular litigant's actions could properly be reached. Overbreadth
analysis is not applied in every case, but only where the law is capable
of a substantial number of impermissible applications, substantially in-
volves first amendment interests and there is no adequate judicial tech-
nique for drawing lines between the valid and the invalid applications
of the law.194
1. The Theoretical Problem. In habeas corpus litigation the fo-
cus of attention is supposed to be the prisoner and the "basic justice" of
his incarceration. Overbreadth analysis makes the prisoner and his ac-
tions virtually irrelevant.'95 Yet the Supreme Court and some lower
courts have heard overbreadth attacks on habeas without recognizing
context are also applicable here. There is no incentive for withholding the claim from the state
courts; there will be no retrial; and there is no threat posed to state procedural rules. The chief
difference between this situation and the failure to raise a point on appeal is that the state may
have a stronger interest in having one of its courts examine the constitutional question than in
having two of them do so. It should be kept in mind, however, that the one court would be a trial
court, whose basic function is to adjudicate facts and apply law to fact and not to make authorita-
tive pronouncements on constitutional issues.
192. Cf. White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional
Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67, 85 (1972) (arguing that "[tihe social importance of vindicating a
constitutional claim is one factor a court should consider in determining whether a waiver of the
claim by the defendant's attorney will bind the defendant in subsequent proceedings").
193. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
194. First Amendment-Overbreadth 858-63; see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 216 (1975).
195. In many overbreadth opinions the court does not even discuss the individual's conduct.
E.g., Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Radford v. Webb,
446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978); Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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any incongruity.'96 Other courts have held such challenges to be inap-
propriate in a habeas proceeding.197 None of the opinions suggests that
the courts have given much thought to the problem.
This issue deserves greater attention than it has received, espe-
cially in view of Stone. 98 If Stone is the harbinger of a general "inno-
cence" test for determining which issues may be raised on habeas, then
collateral review of overbreadth claims is probably doomed.' 99 Only
by stretching the concept of innocence out of shape could the Court say
that a defendant is innocent in a first amendment case because the stat-
ute improperly applies to the hypothetical acts of someone else.20
Quite apart from the specific holding in Stone, the personal nature
of the writ and its historical function as a remedy for "affronts to the
conscience of a civilized society" and those restraints that society finds
"intolerable," with the ultimate object being "basic justice" to the pris-
201oner, seem inconsistent with overbreadth review. Consider, for ex-
ample, the contrast between overbreadth and double jeopardy. A
double jeopardy petition may not claim innocence, but at least it asserts
the right of the prisoner himself not to be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, and the focus of attention is on the justice of the pris-
oner's confinement. Overbreadth is not a means of doing justice in the
applicant's case, or even a means of protecting his constitutional rights,
but rather is aimed at defending the rights of others.
2. The Calculus oflnterests. It would, however, be short-sighted
to dismiss overbreadth claims just because they do not fit comfortably
within the theory underlying the availability of habeas corpus. Apart
196. E.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Squire v. Pace, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975); Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 924 (1975); Radford
v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978); Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Ohio 1975);
Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
197. E.g., Waiters v. Clement, 544 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1977); Gagnon v. Cupp, 454 F.2d 287
(9th Cir. 1972); Wenzler v. Pitchess, 359 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967);
cf. Royal v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 397 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.N.H. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 1084 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976) (overbreadth review not
appropriate on habeas where statute has been repealed); Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp.
165, 170 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (because the writ protects personal rights, the court will not use
overbreadth analysis when as-applied review is sufficient to do justice in the case at hand). As to
the personal nature of the writ, see the authorities cited at note 29 supra.
198. The question is raised but not discussed in HART & WECHSLER 210 n.2.
199. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 518 n.13 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. But cf First .4mendment-Overbreadth 848 ("As a theoretical matter the claimant is as-
serting his own right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law, though naturally the
claim is not one which depends on the privileged character of his own conduct") (footnote omit-
ted).
201. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
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from habeas, the only manner in which state statutes may be tested in
federal court is by appeal of a conviction to the Supreme Court,202 re-
moval of the proceedings to a federal court, 0 3 a suit for a declaratory
judgment2" or a suit for injunctive relief.2 05 Appeal is an unsatisfac-
tory alternative because the Court may, for reasons of its own, decline
to examine the merits fully.206 Removal is generally unavailable in free
speech cases.207 Declaratory actions are often barred by lack of a con-
crete controversy.20 When there is a controversy in the form of pend-
ing state proceedings, the Supreme Court has limited declaratory and
injunctive relief on the ground that federal interference with pending
state proceedings is inimical to "Our Federalism" unless the state pro-
ceedings are instituted or conducted in bad faith.2 9  Thus, habeas
corpus might be the only viable federal forum for the assertion of over-
breadth claims.
An evaluation of overbreadth review in terms of its impact on fed-
eralism and finality is more problematic. In terms of federalism, over-
breadth review is inherently more intrusive than a review limited to a
consideration of the validity of a law as applied to the particular facts
of the case. But the Supreme Court has determined that the advantages
in protecting free speech outweigh this disadvantage. That a case arises
on habeas is no reason to count this characteristic intrusiveness against
it a second time. In fact, since habeas review takes place only after
state proceedings have run their course, habeas is a less intrusive way
of asserting overbreadth claims than is removal or a suit for injunctive
relief. Furthermore, overbreadth claims are less intrusive than many
other kinds of claims on habeas because they do not ever require the
relitigation of facts.
The absence of any need to relitigate facts also lowers the finality
costs of overbreadth habeas, as does the impossibility of retrial follow-
ing a successful overbreadth attack. In addition, a relatively high pro-
202. There is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court where a state statute is upheld on its face,
as would be the case in an unsuccessful overbreadth attack. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
203. Id. § 1443(l) (1976).
204. Id. § 2201 (1976).
205. Eg., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
206. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964); A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 126
(1962); HART & WECHSLER 660-62; Note, The Precedential Effect of Summary Ajffirmances and
Dismissals for Want of a Substantial Federal Question by the Supreme Court After Hicks v.
Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REv. 117, 125-30 (1978).
207. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966).
208. See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
209. Eg., Samueis v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see
Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE LJ. 1103, 1132-33 (1977).
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portion of overbreadth challenges are successful.110 The significance of
this last point, however, is open to question. These challenges are suc-
cessful because the statute is too broad, not because the prisoner is nec-
essarily innocent of acts that the state may properly punish. Effective
enforcement of the criminal law is surely obstructed when prisoners
must be released even though they could properly be punished-all in
the interests of protecting someone else's rights.
3. Compromises. Should overbreadth review be allowed in view
of these considerations? Perhaps not, if the integrity of habeas were
jeopardized by such an exception to the customary functions of habeas
or if the state's finality interest in effective punishment of offenders
were valued highly enough. These objections to overbreadth review on
habeas might be satisfactorily met only by barring such claims alto-
gether. For example, the obvious suggestion for overcoming the final-
ity objection is to allow only litigants whose conduct is constitutionally
protected to assert overbreadth claims on habeas. A major justification
for overbreadth review, however, is that these individuals might be in-
hibited from exercising their rights in the first place.21' Accordingly,
such a rule would largely emasculate the overbreadth doctrine as a
means for dealing effectively with the chilling effect of sweeping laws.
In addition, a proper overbreadth case, by definition, involves a statute
that the courts cannot rehabilitate by drawing lines to separate pro-
tected from unprotected conduct. 12 Finally, such a rule could make
the liberty of an unprotected violator turn on the fortuity of whether his
case arises before or after the case of a person whose conduct is pro-
tected.
If the finality interests threatened by the overbreadth doctrine are
thought too strong to ignore, a better approach might be to allow over-
breadth claims on habeas where the petitioner's conduct is "arguably
210. Among the forty-seven federal first amendment habeas corpus cases listed in the Ap-
pendix infra, the court reached the merits of an overbreadth claim in thirteen cases; seven were
successful challenges, see cases cited at note 196 supra, and six were unsuccessful, Moore v.
Newell, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977); Thompson v. Gaffney, 540 F.2d
251 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977); Arbeitman v. District Court, 522 F.2d 1031
(2d Cir. 1975); Means v. Solem, 457 F. Supp. 1256 (D.S.D. 1978); Deeds v. Beto, 353 F. Supp. 840
(N.D. Tex. 1973); McLaurin v. Burnley, 279 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Miss. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 773
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
211. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Sf Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) (overbreadth
doctrine "applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context," partly because commer-
cial speech is less likely to be inhibited by overbroad laws than is noncommercial speech).
212. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1975); Gooding v. Wil-
son, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
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protected."2 13 This rule would obviate the need to draw lines between
protected and unprotected conduct,2 14 and fortuities could be some-
what mitigated by the retroactive application of decisions striking
down statutes on habeas. Moreover, the "arguably protected" standard
balances the finality interest with the protective interest embodied in
the overbreadth doctrine, thereby saving the fragile first amendment
rights from complete subordination to the state's interest in finality.
However, the proposed standard seemingly fails to reconcile the theo-
retical inconsistency between overbreadth review and habeas corpus. 21 5
Another compromise might be simply to require greater overbreadth in
habeas than otherwise.2"6 However, "substantial" overbreadth is al-
ready a requisite of overbreadth review.217 An additional substantiality
requirement is likely to be imprecise and subject to inconsistent appli-
cation. More importantly, it would impair the effectiveness of the over-
breadth doctrine without directly attacking either of the perceived ills.
Overbreadth habeas would remain inconsistent with the theory of
habeas, and guilty petitioners would still be freed in contravention of
the state's finality interest.
Before abandoning overbreadth habeas as inconsistent with the
theory and history of the writ, however, certain other aspects of the
writ's history should be taken into account. Habeas has survived many
changes since the thirteenth century when it was "used for the purpose
of getting a party before the court so that a case in which he was in-
213. Under this test the court would not determine whether the petitioner's activity is pro-
tected by the first amendment, but would examine the statute for facial invalidity if the petitioner
could make a colorable first amendment argument. For example, overbreadth review would be
denied if the petitioner had engaged in bookmaking activities, which clearly are not protected.
See Rossitto v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1973). The impingement upon the state's
finality interest is less than it would be under a traditional overbreadth examination, since the
"arguably protected" standard would be unavailable to those whose conduct is clearly unpro-
tected. Yet, by according an examination of the facial invalidity of a statute to one whose conduct
is arguably-but not necessarily-protected, the proposed standard preserves much of the protec-
tion against chill of first amendment rights that the overbreadth doctrine is designed to provide.
This standard is somewhat analogous to the test developed by the Supreme Court in the area
of preemption of state law by the federal labor laws, where courts must determine whether the
conduct subject to state law is arguably protected or arguably prohibited by federal labor law.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
214. See First Amendment-Overbreadth 910 n.262.
215. See text accompanying notes 195-201 supra.
216. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (suggesting that more over-
breadth is required when "conduct and not merely speech is involved"). See generally Note, Over-
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L.REv. 532, 538-43 (1974) (discussing Broadrik).
217. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630-31 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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volved could be adjudicated."2 ' The steady expansion of cognizable
issues on a petition is one of these changes. Another is the attenuation
of the concept of custody, which also reflects a greater contemporary
sensitivity to claims for protection of constitutional rights. Yet in aban-
doning the physical-restraint requirement, the Supreme Court has
abandoned the very foundation underlying the development of the
writ. No more severe break with theory and history could be imagined.
Similarly, the exhaustion requirement is foreign to the nature and pur-
pose of the writ, but was engrafted onto it by the Supreme Court as a
way of preserving the values of federalism. In deciding whether the
advantages of overbreadth review warrant a deviation from the de-
mands of theory or of the more specific rule of Stone, the Court should
keep this historical flexibility in mind. The theoretical integrity of
habeas is important, but it has never been sacred.21 9
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
A comprehensive account of the contextual approach to habeas
requires an analysis of the intrusions on federalism and finality of each
kind of habeas claim, a determination of whether there exists a special
need for habeas in connection with each particular constitutional right
and determinations as to which rights are most closely related to the
historical function of habeas-to lift intolerable restraints and to work
basic justice. No comprehensive account is needed, however, in order
to conclude that first amendment habeas is distinctive and warrants
more liberal treatment no matter how procedural rights are handled.
In addition, some of the principles applicable to first amendment
claims can be applied in other contexts. For example, to the extent that
special treatment for first amendment habeas petitions rests on the sub-
stantive character of the rights at stake, such as the relationship of free
218. D. MEADOR, supra note 18, at 8.
219. In connection with overbreadth habeas, the case of Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), is
worth noting. In that habeas case, a white man was permitted to challenge his conviction on the
basis that the grand and petit jury selection process discriminated against blacks. Three members
of the Court voted to permit the challenge on the ground that the prisoner's own rights may have
been violated, since "the exclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of
citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive to admit of confinement to
particular issues or particular cases." Id at 503. Three members of the Court concurred in the
judgment on reasoning analogous to the justification for overbreadth. They pointed out that a
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976), makes it a crime to discriminate on the basis of race in
selecting jurors and said they "would implement the strong statutory policy of § 243, which re-
flects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment with racial discrimination, by permitting
petitioner to challenge his conviction on the ground that Negroes were arbitrarily excluded from
the grand jury that indicted him." 407 U.S. at 507. They did not address the further question
whether such an attack is appropriate on a habeas corpus petition.
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speech rights to the history and theory of habeas220 and in connection
with diminished finality costs, 221 the same justification might be offered
for liberal review of other substantive rights claimed on habeas.222
There may be other rights that share the fragility of free speech or
otherwise deserve special attention. One situation that comes quickly
to mind is that of the prisoner condemned to death. Should not his
petition be exempt from strict procedural default rules and the new
limits on cognizability? At the root of habeas is the principle that con-
finement is sufficient reason to override the ordinary rules of res judi-
cata. The prospect of death may be deemed good reason to ignore
ordinary rules of habeas practice.223
Fragile rights are also at stake when a prisoner asserts that the
rights of third persons are violated by the application of a law to his
conduct.224 For example, suppose the state makes it a crime to give
away contraceptives to single persons, and a person convicted of the
crime asserts on a petition for habeas corpus that the statute violates
not his own rights but the rights of unmarried persons to receive con-
traceptives.225 Standing to assert jus tertii is ordinarily allowed when
220. See text accompanying notes 54-77 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 90-102 supra.
222. Apart from free speech claims, the substantive issues most often litigated in habeas ap-
pear to be those based on vagueness and privacy. E.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (writ
denied); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (writ denied); Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573
F.2d 698 (Ist Cir. 1978) (writ granted); Gable v. Massey, 566 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 975 (1978) (writ denied); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977
(1976) (writ denied); Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1970), afJ'd, 437 F.2d
500 (5th Cir. 1971) (writ granted).
223. For example, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482-87 (1953), a capital case, the petitioner
had not met a sixty-day deadline for serving the statement of the case on appeal. Although the
statement was delivered on the 61st day, Fay had not yet been decided, and this procedural viola-
tion was held to bar habeas. Even under a scheme of strict procedural default, this result seems
unduly harsh when the prisoner is condemned to death. Cf. White, supra note 192, at 82-85
(standard for procedural default should depend in part on the social importance of the rights
asserted).
224. See generally Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertil, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423
(1974).
225. These are the basic facts of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court granted
the writ without considering the problems raised by ajus tertii claim in habeas. The issue is raised
but not explored in HART & WECHSLER 187 n.l. See Mucie v. Missouri State Dep't of Correc-
tions, 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976) (implicitly permitting abortionist to raise his patient's right to
privacy); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977) (not permitting psychiatrist to raise his patient's right to privacy); Vuitch v. Hardy, 473
F.2d 1370 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 824 (1973) (implicitly permitting abortionist to raise his
patient's right to privacy); United States ex rel Williams v. Zelker, 445 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1971),
opinion on the merits sub nom. United States ex rel Williams v. Preiser, 497 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974) (implicitly permitting abortionist to raise his patient's right to
privacy); Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 556 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1977)
(implicitly permitting abortionist to raise his patient's right to privacy, but denying the writ on the
merits); cf. Spears v. Circuit Court, 517 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1975) (not permitting a nonphysician to
challenge an abortion statute on habeas); Harling v. Department of Health and Social Services,
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there is a close relationship between the claimant and the third person,
when it is impossible for the third person to assert his rights, and when
a refusal to allow assertion of jus tertii would result in a dilution of the
third person's rights.226
The parallels of jus tertii to overbreadth analysis are readily ap-
parent. But there is also a significant difference. If an overbreadth
claim is not permitted, the protected persons will remain able to assert
their rights in the event the statute is applied to them. If assertions of
jus tertii are not allowed, the protected person will be foreclosed be-
cause his rights "are at stake in the actual proceeding in which the jus
tertii claim is raised. 227 Enjoyment of constitutional rights may be
chilled in the overbreadth context, but refusal to grant standing to as-
sert jus tertii will forever bar the protected individuals from vindicating
their rights.22
The contextual approach to the availability of habeas corpus is not
without difficulties. To devise a general theory of context, the courts
would need to resolve many novel issues concerning the functions and
the relative fragility of rights and identify subtle differences in the
strength of the interests in finality and federalism among the various
contexts. Contextual comparisons among procedural rights, most of
which serve roughly the same function of guaranteeing fair process and
entail roughly similar intrusions upon finality and federalist values,
may not result in useful contextual distinctions. The first amendment,
however, is one area where reasonably sharp distinctions based on con-
text can be drawn. Some other possibilities have been noted in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. And, of course, the suggestions made here are not
intended to be exhaustive. Properly employed, the examination of con-
text can play an important, if limited, role in the debate over the proper
scope of habeas corpus. Consideration of context can illuminate the
value choices that habeas requires and consequently can facilitate the
making of rules that more accurately reflect the shifting strengths of the
interests at stake as the discussion moves from one constitutional right
to another.
323 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (permitting a nonphysician to challenge an abortion statute on
habeas).
226: See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972); Note, supra note 224, at 425.
227. First Amendment-Overbreadh 848 n.18.
228. See Note, supra note 224, at 435-36, 438-40.
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APPENDIX-PUBLISHED FEDERAL FIRST AMENDMENT HABEAS CORPUS
DECISIONS ARISING FROM STATE COURT CONVICTIONS 1963-1978
United States Supreme Court
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (flag desecration; writ granted).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (profane language; writ granted).
Decisions Within:
The First Circuit
Royal v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 531 F.2d 1084 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
867 (1976) (flag desecration; writ granted).
Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 502 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1974) (flag desecration;
writ granted).
Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970) (obscenity; writ
granted).
The Second Circuit
Arbeitman v. District Court, 522 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1975) (obstructing traffic in the course of
a demonstration; writ denied).
Epton v. Nenna, 446 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1971) (conspiracy to riot;
writ denied) (procedural default issue-failure to request jury instruction).
Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (casting contempt on the flag;
writ granted).
The Third Circuit
Rossitto v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1973) (bookmaking; writ denied).
The Fourth Circuit
Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) (disorderly
conduct; writ denied because $50 fine was not a sufficient restraint to constitute custody).
Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975) (telephone profan-
ity; writ granted).
Squire v. Pace, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975) (disorderly conduct;
writ granted).
Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (profanity over the telephone; writ
granted).
The Fifth Circuit
Walters v. Clement, 544 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1977) (loitering and prowling; statute attacked as
overbroad but court said overbreadth not appropriate in habeas; writ denied).
McKinney v. Parsons, 513 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 960 (1975) (obscenity;
writ denied).
Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 924 (1975) (disorderly
conduct; writ granted).
Pickens v. Texas, 497 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974) (disorderly con-
duct; writ denied).
Thomas v. Crevasse, 415 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970) (contempt
for passing out handbills in front of grand jury room; writ granted).
HiUegas v. Sams, 349 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966) (vagrancy;
writ denied for failure to exhaust state remedies).
Brown v. Rayfield, 320 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 902 (1963) (parading without
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a permit; writ denied for failure to exhaust state remedies).
Deeds v. Beto, 353 F. Supp. 840 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (flag desecration; writ denied).
Gornto v. McDougall, 336 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D. Ga. 1972), dismissed as moot, 482 F.2d 361
(5th Cir. 1973) (obscenity; writ denied).
Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (disorderly conduct; writ granted) (proce-
dural default issue due to failure to appeal in state court, discussion in an earlier opinion, 318 F.
Supp. 17, 19 (M.D. Fla. 1970), held not a deliberate bypass).
McLaurin v. Burnley, 279 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Miss. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970) (breach of the peace; writ denied).
The Sixth Circuit
Moore v. Newell, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 971 (1977) (extortion; statute
challenged as overbroad; writ denied).
Thompson v. Gaffney, 540 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977) (disor-
derly conduct; writ denied).
Smith v. Sheeter, 402 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (disruption of college activities; writ
granted) (procedural default issue-failure to appeal in state courts held not a deliberate bypass).
Summerlin v. Sheriff, 350 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (obscenity; writ granted).
The Seventh Circuit
Amato v. Divine, 558 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1977) (obscenity; writ granted).
Orito v. Powers, 479 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1973) (obscenity; writ granted).
Raby v. Woods, 440 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1971) (blocking traffic in the course of a demonstra-
tion; writ denied; evidentiary hearing in the district court).
Heilman v. Wolke, 427 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (contempt, advertising; writ denied).
Simpson v. Spice, 390 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (obscenity; writ granted).
Simpson v. Spice, 318 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (obscenity; writ denied for failure to
exhaust state remedies).
The Eighth Circuit
Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976) (profane language; writ granted, but the
state was permitted to retry the petitioner under a proper test).
Russell v. City of Pierre, 530 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (disorderly
conduct; writ denied because $25 fine was not sufficient restraint to satisfy the custody require-
ment).
Means v. Solem, 457 F. Supp. 1256 (D.S.D. 1978) (riot statute challenged on overbreadth and
other grounds; writ denied).
Means v. Solem, 440 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.D. 1977) (state court revoked bail for exercise of first
amendment rights; writ granted).
The Ninth Circuit
Naylor v. Superior Court, 558 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978)
(loitering; writ denied; case was moot since there were no longer any restraints on petitioner nor
any collateral consequences of his conviction).
Wasserman v. Municipal Court, 543 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1976) (obscenity; writ denied).
Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (newsman
asserting first amendment privilege against disclosing information held in contempt; writ denied).
Gagnon v. Cupp, 454 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972) (soliciting for a prostitute; statute challenged
on overbreadth grounds; writ denied).
Pinkus v. Pitchess, 429 F.2d 416 (9th Cir.), affd by an equaly divided court, 400 U.S. 922
(1970) (obscenity; writ granted).
Wenzler v. Pitchess, 359 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967) (obscenity;
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writ denied).
Glen v. Hongisto, 438 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (labor organizer in contempt; writ
granted).
Maita v. Whitmore, 365 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'don other grounds, 508 F.2d 143
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) (contempt, nightclub act; writ denied on the first
amendment claim).
Hairston v. Pitchess, 323 F. Supp. 784 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (sentence imposed upon conviction
for remaining at the scene of a riot challenged as chilling others' first amendment rights; writ
denied).

